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Información bibliográfica

Datos generales

Títulos

Understanding Antitrust and Its Economic Implications

Autores

E. Thomas Sullivan, Jeffrey HarrisonE. Thomas Sullivan, Jeffrey Harrison; Lexis Nexis

Ubicación

Libro - 13.5.2 - S89

Edición

1a

Ciudad

[No definido]

Fecha Publicación

2014

Editorial

Matthew Bender

Temas

CONCENTRACIONES ECONÓMICAS; ANÁLISIS ECONÓMICO DE COMPETENCIA

CONTENIDO

Chapter 1. ANTITRUST POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION. THE FOCUS OF ANTITRUST. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ANTITRUST GOALS. EARLY INTERPRETATION. Chapter 2. ANTITRUST ECONOMICS. INTRODUCTION. PERFECT COMPETITION. Demand and Supply. Elasticity. Market Equilibrium. The Individual Firm Under Perfect Competition: The Marginal Revenue = Marginal Cost Rule. Equilibrium Under Perfect Competition. MONOPOLY. MONOPOLY V. COMPETITION: A SYNTHESIS. OLIGOPOLY. MARKET POWER. The Economic Theory of Market Power. Market Power in the Courts. Chapter 3 ANTITRUST COVERAGE: JURISDICTION, ENFORCEMENT, AND EXCEPTIONS. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT. Standing. Antitrust Injury. Direct Purchaser Requirement. “DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ‘COMMERCE’ JURISDICTION”. Sherman Act Requirements. Clayton Act Requirements. International Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws. FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSES. COMMON LAW DEFENSES. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES. FEDERALISM. Chapter 4 HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS AND CARTEL BEHAVIOR. POLICY INTRODUCTION. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, MARKET POWER AND HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS. Price Fixing Effectiveness. Output Analysis. Market Power Analysis. ANCILLARY RESTRAINT DOCTRINE. RULE OF REASON DEVELOPMENT. PER SE RULE OF ILLEGALITY AND PRICE FIXING. MODERN TREATMENT OF THE PER SE RULE. TREND TOWARD A STRUCTURED RULE OF REASON FOR PRICE FIXING. THE RULE OF REASON AND ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT BY PROFESSIONALS. TRADE ASSOCIATION AND DATA DISSEMINATION ACTIVITY. JOINT VENTURES. MAXIMUM PRICE-FLXING SCHEMES. CONCERTED REFUSALS TO DEAL. HORIZONTAL MARKET DIVISIONS. REVERSE PAYMENT PATENT SETTLEMENTS. THE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE. Proof of an Agreement. Oligopoly Pricing and Facilitating Devices. The Plurality Requirement & Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy. CRIMINAL LIABILITY. Chapter 5 VERTICAL RESTRAINTS. INTRABRAND DISTRIBUTIONAL RESTRAINTS. lntrabrand Restraints and the Free Rider Problem. Vertical Restraints on Price: Shifting Positions. The Treatment of Agreements in the Pre-Leegin Period. Territorial and Customer Restraints. Dual Distribution. Exclusive Dealerships. INTERBRAND VERTICAL FORECLOSURE. Exclusive Dealing. Tying Arrangements. Chapter 6. MONOPOLIZATION AND RELATED OFFENSES. THE ECONOMICS OF MONOPOLY.  THE MODERN OFFENSE OF MONOPOLIZATION: THE SEARCH FOR STANDARDS. MARKETS UNDER. MONOPOLIZING CONDUCT. ATTEMPT TO MONOPOLIZE. Intent. Dangerous Probability of Success. Conduct Generally. The Use of Leverage. Predatory Pricing. Discounted Bundies. OLIGOPOLY AND “SHARED MONOPOLY”. CONSPIRACY TO MONOPOLIZE. Chapter 7 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS. HORIZONTAL MERGERS. NON-HORIZONTAL MERGERS. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MERGERS. LEGAL ANALYSIS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: AN OVERVIEW. MERGERS UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT: THE EARLY YEARS. . FAILING COMPANY DEFENSE. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER GUIDELINES. Product Market. Geographic Markets. Calculating Market Shares. Remedies. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS. INTERNATIONAL MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS. Chapter 8. PRICE DISCRIMINATION. Price “Discrimination” and Price “Difference”. THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION. First-Degree Price Discrimination Second-Degree Price Discrimination. Third-Degree Price Discrimination. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES Two Prices and Two Sales. Price Differences. Discounts Base Point Pricing Indirect Price Discrimination. Indirect Purchasers.  “Commodities” of “Grade and Quality”. INJURY TO COMPETITION. SELLER’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. THE PER SE OFFENSES. BUYER LIABILITY

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Inventario Cooperante Estado
1 000793 Centro de Documentación Disponible