Legal framework and Commission procedure. The Merger Regulation. Procedure Law notification and assessment. The role of economics in EU merger control. Basic economic concepts. The demand curve. The cost curve. Profit maximization. Market power. Empirical economic evidence. Market definition. Conceptual framework.
The hypothetical monopolist/SSNIP test. Issues and complications arising in market definition. Empirical techniques to assess market definition. Critical loss analysis. Demand estimation. Survey evidence. Analysis of sales patterns SI. Analysis of price levels. Price correlation analysis. Stationarity analysis. Shock analysis. Horizontal mergers 1: unilateral effects. Important competitive constraints: economic theory and the EC Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Economic theory and key concepts. lrnporlant competiÉive constraints in the EC Horizontal
Merger Guidelines. Commission’s recent enforcement practice. Important competitive constraints between the parties: empirical techniques. Survey evidence. Customer switching analysis. Price/concentration studies and analysis of me impact of rivals’ presence. Entry analysis. Natural experiments. Merger simulation. Win/loss and bidding analysis. Further issues relevant in the assessment of unilateral effects. Elimination of potential competition. Rivals’ ability lo increase supply. Switching costs. Partial ownership. Countervailing factors. Buyer power. Product repositioning and new entry. Efficiency analysis.
Failing firm defence. Horizontal mergers II: coordinated effects. Economic concepts. Textbook tacit coordination. Factors that affect he critical discount factor. Framework for the assessment of coordinated effects. Will the merged entity and remaining competitors be able to reach a tacit understanding?. Are market characteristics such that any tacit understanding would likely be sustained? Will the proposed transaction make it significantly note likely that tacit coordination will occur or make tacit coordination more effective?. Non-horizontal mergers. Economic concepts. Pro-competitive effects. Foreclosure and anti-competitive foreclosure. Other anti-competitive effects. Vertical mergers; input foreclosure. Ability to engage in inpnt foreclosure. Incentive to engage in input foreclosure. Effect of input foreclosure. Vertical mergers: customer foreclosure. Ability to engage in customer foreclosure. Incentive to engage in customer foreclosure. Effect of customer foreclosure. Custorner foreclosure: EU case Law. Conglomerare mergers. Ability to foreclose in conglomerate mergers. Incentive to foreclose in conglomerate mergers. Effects of foreclosure in conglornerate merger’s. Foreclosure ‘m conglomerate mergers an example. Assessrnent of foreclosure in conglomerate rnergers: EU case law. Diagonal mergers. Diagonal mergers: an example. Case study: Google/Doubleclick — assessment of diagonal effects. Regression analysis aud econometrics. Regression analysis and statistical inference. Regression analysis, endogeneity and the identification of economic effects. Models for demand estimation. Alternative models fin continuous demand estimation. Models for discrete demand estimation
