Chapter 1. ANTITRUST POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION. THE
FOCUS OF ANTITRUST. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND ANTITRUST GOALS. EARLY INTERPRETATION.
Chapter 2. ANTITRUST ECONOMICS. INTRODUCTION. PERFECT COMPETITION. Demand and
Supply. Elasticity. Market Equilibrium. The Individual Firm Under Perfect
Competition: The Marginal Revenue = Marginal Cost Rule. Equilibrium Under
Perfect Competition. MONOPOLY. MONOPOLY V. COMPETITION: A SYNTHESIS. OLIGOPOLY.
MARKET POWER. The Economic Theory of Market Power. Market Power in the Courts. Chapter
3 ANTITRUST COVERAGE: JURISDICTION, ENFORCEMENT, AND EXCEPTIONS. PRIVATE
ENFORCEMENT. Standing. Antitrust Injury. Direct Purchaser Requirement.
“DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST ‘COMMERCE’ JURISDICTION”. Sherman Act
Requirements. Clayton Act Requirements. International Application of U.S.
Antitrust Laws. FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSES. COMMON LAW DEFENSES. ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
IN REGULATED INDUSTRIES. FEDERALISM. Chapter 4 HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS AND CARTEL
BEHAVIOR. POLICY INTRODUCTION. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, MARKET POWER AND HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS.
Price Fixing Effectiveness. Output Analysis. Market Power Analysis. ANCILLARY
RESTRAINT DOCTRINE. RULE OF REASON DEVELOPMENT. PER SE RULE OF ILLEGALITY AND
PRICE FIXING. MODERN TREATMENT OF THE PER SE RULE. TREND TOWARD A STRUCTURED
RULE OF REASON FOR PRICE FIXING. THE RULE OF REASON AND ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT
BY PROFESSIONALS. TRADE ASSOCIATION AND DATA DISSEMINATION ACTIVITY. JOINT VENTURES.
MAXIMUM PRICE-FLXING SCHEMES. CONCERTED REFUSALS TO DEAL. HORIZONTAL MARKET
DIVISIONS. REVERSE PAYMENT PATENT SETTLEMENTS. THE CONSPIRACY DOCTRINE. Proof
of an Agreement. Oligopoly Pricing and Facilitating Devices. The Plurality
Requirement & Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy. CRIMINAL LIABILITY. Chapter 5
VERTICAL RESTRAINTS. INTRABRAND DISTRIBUTIONAL RESTRAINTS. lntrabrand
Restraints and the Free Rider Problem. Vertical Restraints on Price: Shifting
Positions. The Treatment of Agreements in the Pre-Leegin Period. Territorial
and Customer Restraints. Dual Distribution. Exclusive Dealerships. INTERBRAND
VERTICAL FORECLOSURE. Exclusive Dealing. Tying Arrangements. Chapter 6. MONOPOLIZATION
AND RELATED OFFENSES. THE ECONOMICS OF MONOPOLY. THE MODERN OFFENSE OF MONOPOLIZATION: THE
SEARCH FOR STANDARDS. MARKETS UNDER. MONOPOLIZING CONDUCT. ATTEMPT TO
MONOPOLIZE. Intent. Dangerous Probability of Success. Conduct Generally. The
Use of Leverage. Predatory Pricing. Discounted Bundies. OLIGOPOLY AND “SHARED
MONOPOLY”. CONSPIRACY TO MONOPOLIZE. Chapter 7 MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS.
HORIZONTAL MERGERS. NON-HORIZONTAL MERGERS. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MERGERS. LEGAL
ANALYSIS OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: AN OVERVIEW. MERGERS UNDER THE SHERMAN
ACT: THE EARLY YEARS. . FAILING COMPANY DEFENSE. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MERGER
GUIDELINES. Product Market. Geographic Markets. Calculating Market Shares.
Remedies. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS. INTERNATIONAL
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS. Chapter 8. PRICE DISCRIMINATION. Price “Discrimination”
and Price “Difference”. THE ECONOMICS OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION. First-Degree
Price Discrimination Second-Degree Price Discrimination. Third-Degree Price
Discrimination. DEFINITIONAL ISSUES Two Prices and Two Sales. Price Differences.
Discounts Base Point Pricing Indirect Price Discrimination. Indirect Purchasers.
“Commodities” of “Grade and
Quality”. INJURY TO COMPETITION. SELLER’S AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES. THE PER SE
OFFENSES. BUYER LIABILITY
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